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The Theory of Aḥwāl and Arguments against
the Law of Non-Contradiction
Introduction
Following the rise of dialetheism—the view that some contradictions are true—in the
1980s, there was a growing interest in exploring and searching for the possible op-
ponents of the law of non-contradiction throughout the history of philosophy, in
both the East and the West. However, between these two—that is, philosophy in Eu-
rope and philosophy in India and East Asia—there was a philosophical tradition in
the Islamicate world which, as far as I know, has been overlooked from this dialethe-
ic point of view. In this paper, I will discuss some arguments against the law of non-
contradiction (henceforth, LNC) set forth by some philosophers in the Islamicate
world. The text in which these arguments can be found is Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s mag-
num opus Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʾaḫḫirīn (The Compendium of
the Thought of the Ancients and the Moderns).
It should be noted that Rāzī (d. 1210) himself is not an opponent of the LNC or
the law of excluded middle (henceforth, LEM). However, in a review of the ideas of
his predecessors, he discusses the opposition to the LNC. The arguments against the
LNC appear in the first part of the book in his discussion of assents (taṣdīqāt). Ac-
cording to Rāzī, some assents are based on sense-perception (henceforth, sensible
assents), such as “the fire is hot,” and some are self-evident, such as “negation
and affirmation do not combine and cannot be denied” (al-nafy wa-l-iṯbāt lā yaǧta-
miʿān wa-lā yartafiʿān). As Rāzī explains, some philosophers deny sensible assents
altogether and some accept some of them. Similarly, some philosophers deny all
self-evident assents and some confirm that there are self-evident assents. Hence,
four possibilities emerge, and thus there will be four groups of thinkers. The first
is those who accept both sensible and self-evident assents. As Rāzī says, these con-
stitute the majority. The second group contains those who accept self-evident as-
sents, but deny sensible assents. Rāzī names Plato, Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Galen
as members of this group and then discusses their arguments for rejecting sensible
assents. The third group is made up of those who deny self-evident assents, but ac-
cept sensible assents. Rāzī does not explicitly tell us who they are, but he puts for-
ward their arguments against self-evident assents, such as the LNC and the LEM. In
fact, these arguments are the main concern of this paper. As we will see, they are
based on Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāʾī’s theory of aḥwāl.¹ Finally, the fourth group is
 Two comments are in order here. First, the Muʿtazilites are famous for advocating rationality and
asking for the arguments for every claim. This third group of thinkers about whom Rāzī is speaking
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formed of those who deny both self-evident assents and sensible assents. According
to Rāzī, the Sophists belong to this group.
Since the arguments against the LNC are logically based on Abū Hāšim’s theory
of aḥwāl (i.e., states), before discussing the arguments, I should briefly explain the
theory of states and its main claim: that there is a middle (wāsiṭah) between exis-
tence and non-existence, or, in other words, that some things are neither existent
nor non-existent. Thus, according to Abū Hāšim, there are truth-value gaps.² In
fact, it was not uncommon among the mutakallimūn (i.e., the Islamic theologians)
to hold views which accepted some truth-value gaps or gluts.³ Thus, in the first sec-
tion, I will explain the theory of states which is the basis of the aforementioned argu-
ments against the LNC. In the second part, we will discuss the arguments that Rāzī
put forward. After this, in the third part, we will see the relationship between other
so-called self-evident assents and the LNC. These are the three following assents:
“The whole is bigger than its parts,” “two objects identical with a third object are
identical to each other,” and “an object cannot be in two places at the same
time.” On behalf of the opponents of the LNC, Rāzī also argues that these so-called
self-evident assents are based on the LNC; that is, they are true because of the truth
of the LNC. Finally, in the fourth part, we will encounter a paraconsistent logic and
rejects all self-evident assents. Does this mean that they cannot be among the followers of Abū
Hāšim; i.e., the Bahšamiyyah? The Bahšamiyyah were some of the Muʿtazilites, and thus it does
not seem that this can be the group of the thinkers to whom Rāzī is referring. However, this would
be jumping to conclusions. It is possible to violate the law of non-contradiction and the law of exclud-
ed middle and still ask for reasons and arguments, or, in other words, to remain logical and coherent.
For one explanation, see section 4 of this paper, in which some paraconsistent logics are introduced.
For a detailed discussion, see Graham Priest, Doubt Truth to Be a Liar (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), part 3. Second, in this paper, I provide no historical evidence that this group of thinkers
were among the Bahšamiyyah. I only focus on the relationship between their arguments against the
LNC and the theory of states. In fact, Rāzī is infamous for arguing against many positions for the sake
of argumentation. Thus, it may be the case that those arguments against the LNC belong to Rāzī him-
self and that they are nothing more than dialectical constructions. However, I will not take a side as
to whether there was such a group of thinkers among the Bahšamiyyah or not; my concern here is
only philosophical and not historical.
 Truth-value gaps are propositions which are neither true nor false (or in other words, propositions
which do not take any truth value). Truth-value gluts are propositions which are both true and false.
Consider the proposition “states are existent.” According to the theory of states, this proposition is
neither true nor false. Thus, it is a truth-value gap.
 For some examples, see Ahmed Alwishah and David Sanson, “The Early Arabic Liar: The Liar Para-
dox in the Islamic World from the Mid-Ninth to the Mid-Thirteenth Centuries CE,” Vivarium 47 (2009):
97–127, and Ahad Qaramaleki, “Khafri and the Liar Paradox” [Persian], Journal of Religious Thought of
Shiraz University 11 (2004): 33–44. For the debates between the mutakallimūn and Aristotelian logi-
cians, see Khaled El-Rouayheb, “Theology and Logic,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology,
ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 409–35, and Josef van Ess, “The Log-
ical Structure of Islamic Theology,” in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, ed. Gustave E. von Grune-
baum (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970), 21–50.
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the way it can express the truth-value gaps and gluts in the theory of states without
falling into triviality.
1 The Theory of States
It is well-known that Abū Hāšim invented the theory of states to answer a problem
concerning divine attributes.⁴ However, the theory of states is not confined to this
problem, as states also play an extensive role in Abū Hāšim’s metaphysics. First,
let us discuss the problem of divine attributes and then we will see the other aspects
of the theory of states.
In the Qurʾan, different attributes are ascribed to God. The mutakallimūn were
concerned about the nature of God in relation to these properties. The main question
concerns the relationship between these attributes and the essence of God. There
were two main rival views on this issue in early Kalām: (1) Abū al-Huḏayl al-ʿAllāf
(d. 841) held the view that God is identical with His attributes. For instance, Him
being knowledgeable (ʿālim) implies that being knowledgeable is not a distinct real-
ity from His. Being knowledgeable is God Himself; thus, according to Abū al-Huḏayl,
God’s attributes are not distinct realities from Him and “God’s being knowledgeable”
refers to nothing but God Himself. (2) Ibn Kullāb (d. 859) advocated the view that
God’s attributes are distinct entities from Him and so they are not identical with
God. In his opinion, “being knowledgeable” refers to a reality distinct from and
alongside God.
Each of these views had its problems. On the one hand, if God were identical
with His attributes, He could not be transcendent. Moreover, His attributes, by tran-
sitivity of identity relation, would be identical with each other and thus the differen-
ces between the attributes would disappear: for example, “being knowledgeable”
would be the same as “being powerful.” On the other hand, if God were distinct
from His attributes, then He could not be one, for affirming eternal realities alongside
God means admitting the existence of several Gods. Thus, neither case is acceptable.
To answer this problem of divine attributes, Abū Hāšim came up with his theory of
states.⁵ According to this theory, attributes are aḥwāl (pl. of ḥāl)—that is, states—and
 See Muḥammad Šahrastānī, Nihāyah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1956), 79; Allāmeh-Hellī,
Kašfu l-Murād (Qom: Muʾassese Našr-e Eslami, 1995), 15; Jan Thiele, “Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāʾī’s
(d. 321/933) Theory of ‘States’ (aḥwāl) and Its Adaption by Ashʿarite Theologians,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Islamic Theology, 368; and Richard Frank, Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching
of the Basrian School of the Muʿtazila in the Classical Period (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1978), 16.
 It is worth mentioning that before Abū Hāšim, different theologians had tried to answer this prob-
lem, though all of them were faced with crucial objections. The most notable attempt was that of Abū
Hāšim’s father, Abū ʿAlī al-Ǧubbāʾī (d. 915), who was the head of the Basrian Muʿtazilite school at the
time. For more, see Frank, Beings and Their Attributes, chapter 1.
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aḥwāl are neither existent nor non-existent. But what are aḥwāl and how do they re-
solve the aforementioned problem?
Abū Hāšim borrowed the concept of ḥāl from grammarians. In Arabic grammar,
one of the instances of ḥāl which Abū Hāšim took is the situation or state of the sub-
ject or object of the verb at the time of its occurrence.⁶ For example, in the sentence
ǧāʾanī Zaydun māšīyan (“Zayd came to me walking”), māšīyan (“walking”) is a ḥāl
(“state”); the state in which the verb occurs. Abū Hāšim paraphrases subject–pred-
icate sentences in such a way that the predicate becomes a ḥāl. Consider the sentence
Zaydun ʿālimun (“Zayd is knowledgeable”). For Abū Hāšim, this sentence means
that Zayd is and that he is in the state of being knowledgeable. He paraphrases
the sentence by adding the verb kāna⁷ (“to be” or “to become”). Thus, yakūnu Zaydun
ʿālimun is a paraphrase of Zaydun ʿālimun. Although they both have the same mean-
ing, each implies a different proposition on the metaphysical level. The original sen-
tence is a usual subject–predicate sentence, but the paraphrase is not. The latter im-
plies the being of the subject and then the state in which the subject is. Abū Hāšim
paraphrases all predicates as such. However, as we will see, his use of the concept of
ḥāl is not restricted to predicates.
The Muʿtazilites were atomists and for them, the metaphysical categories consist-
ed of God, atoms, and accidents.⁸ Hence, there was no place for universals or attrib-
utes as such in their categories of beings. Abū Hāšim added aḥwāl to these catego-
ries. One of the distinct roles of aḥwāl was to explain the relationship between
different accidents which go by the same title. Thus, the theory of aḥwāl completes
the Muʿtazilites’ metaphysical picture by explaining universals and attributes as a
specific metaphysical category. Thus, aḥwāl are real. However, they are not objects
(ḏawāt) and they are neither existent nor non-existent. There are five categories of
aḥwāl:⁹
(1) The attribute of essence: this is the self-identity of things. Through this attribute,
objects differ from each other. A thing being itself is the attribute of essence. For
example, for an atom, being an atom is its attribute of essence which makes it
what it is.
(2) Essential attributes: these are the attributes which are entailed as soon as objects
become existent via the attribute of essence. For instance, the essential attribute
of an atom is to occupy space (taḥayyuz).When an atom is non-existent, it is still
an atom; however, it does not occupy space. But as soon as it becomes existent,
 Frank, 20.
 The verb kāna is sometimes a complete verb and sometimes incomplete. Here, the complete form
of kāna, which means “to be” or “to become,” is used.
 Alnoor Dhanani, The Physical Theory of Kalām: Atoms, Space, and Void in Basrian Muʿtazilī Cosmol-
ogy (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 17.
 See Frank, Beings and Their Attributes, 27; Thiele, “Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāʾī’s Theory of States,” 370–
76; and Sabine Schmidtke, “The Muʿtazilite Movement III: The Scholastic Phase,” in The Oxford Hand-
book of Islamic Theology, 163–64.
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it occupies space. Thus, Abū Hāšim and his followers, as well as some of the
other Muʿtazilites, held the view that some objects do not exist. Their idea of ex-
istence and objecthood will become more evident in our discussion of the next
category of aḥwāl.
(3) Attributes which are affected by an agent (al-ṣifāt bi-l-fāʿil): specifically, this at-
tribute is existence. An agent, which can be either God or human, generates an
object and then the object is existent. It is the agent’s action which causes the
existence of the object, and a non-existent object becomes existent through
the action of an agent. Thus, for an object, being existent is a state in which
the essential attributes of the object are actualised. As already mentioned,
some objects are non-existent. For instance, a non-existent atom is still an
atom: it is knowable and we can discuss its attributes as an atom. However,
as long as it is not in the state of existence, its essential attributes, such as oc-
cupying space, are not actualised. What causes it to be in the state of existence
is an act of creation performed by an agent, and what causes a non-existent
(maʿdūm) to be an object is its knowability.¹⁰ Anything that is knowable, whether
existent or non-existent, is an object. However, existence itself is not an object: it
is a state (ḥāl). Since only objects are knowable and states are not objects, states
are not knowable; however, they are real.
(4) Attributes which are grounded in accidents: as already mentioned, the Muʿtazi-
lites’ metaphysical categories consisted of God, atoms, and accidents. Therefore,
they could not explain the similarities and differences between objects by relying
on these categories. One important aspect of this shortcoming is a coherent ac-
count of universals. What is the similarity between a raven and the night sky?
The answer is easy; they are both black. But what is black? According to the Muʿ-
tazilites, an accident (ʿaraḍ) of blackness inheres in a raven and another acci-
dent of blackness inheres in the night sky. These two are distinct accidents;
for one thing, they are in different places. Thus, the Muʿtazilites’ metaphysics
cannot explain the similarity between two black objects. Abū Hāšim’s fourth cat-
egory of states is those states which are grounded in accidents. An object in
which an accident of blackness inheres is in the state of being black. Thus, states
also play the role of universals. Now we can say that the similarity between a
raven and the night sky is the state of being black.
(5) Those states which do not gain actuality by the object itself or by another object,
the most important example of which is “being perceiving.” In contrast to his
predecessors, Abū Hāšim takes perception not as an accident, but as a state.¹¹
 Dhanani, The Physical Theory of Kalām, 30.
 Considering these five categories of aḥwāl, one might ask whether Abū Hāšim was under the in-
fluence of the Stoics, specifically, the theory of hexeis. The historical roots of the theory of states are
not my concern here, but I can say by referring to Dhanani, The Physical Theory of Kalām, 5, that there
is no historical evidence of any direct link between the mutakallimūn and Greek philosophers.
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To sum up, states are neither existent nor non-existent. They are also not objects,
which means that they are not knowable. However, Abū Hāšim explained different
characteristics of states. Moreover, although states are not objects, they are real.
These features of states help Abū Hāšim to reply to the problem of the divine attrib-
utes. According to the theory of states, attributes of God are states. States are real,
and thus they can explain the attributes ascribed to God. However, states are not ob-
jects, and hence, in ascribing His attributes to Him, it does not follow that some ob-
jects are alongside Him. Thus, God’s unity will not be violated. In this way, not only
His unity, but also His transcendence and the reality of His attributes are preserved.
Let us see where the theory of states violates the LNC. That states are neither ex-
istent nor non-existent apparently entails truth-value gaps and thus violates the law
of excluded middle.¹² Avicenna was well aware of the theory of states and calls the
followers of the theory of states those who “are not among the assemblage of the dis-
cerning.”¹³ Some pages later, in his Metaphysics (Ilāhiyyāt) of al-Šifāʾ, while defend-
ing the LNC, he argues that any violation of the LEM entails a violation of the LNC.
The LEM fails when both affirmation and negation are removed. Avicenna tells us
how this leads to the violation of the LNC:
[T1] If both [affirmation and negation] together are false with respect to one thing, then that
thing would, for example, be “not man” and also “not not man.” Hence, the thing which is
“not man” and its negation (which is “not not man”) would have been combined (Avicenna,
Metaphysics of the Healing, 42–43).¹⁴
If this argument works, then the theory of states violates the LNC, and thus it is a
dialetheic theory. There is a middle between existence and non-existence, or, in
other words, states are neither existent nor non-existent. It follows that states are
not existent and not not existent. Therefore, according to Avicenna’s argument, the
middle between existence and non-existence entails a contradiction.
On the other hand, although states are not knowable according to Abū Hāšim, he
has told us about many of their features and we now know several characteristics of
states as well as their roles in his metaphysical theory. This is also a contradiction
and is mentioned by some opponents of the theory of states. Whether these are
good reasons to take the theory of states as a dialetheic theory can be discussed fur-
ther, but for our purposes, these would suffice. Let us now examine the arguments
against the LNC which Rāzī ascribes to those who accept sensible propositions but
deny self-evident propositions.
 It is worth mentioning that this claim is based on the idea that existence and non-existence are
the most general metaphysical categories. In other words, everything is either existent or non-existent
and consequently, predicating existence/non-existence on states is not a categorical mistake.
 Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Utah: Brigham Young Uni-
versity Press, 2005), 27.
 فإنهإذاکذبامعافیشیء،کانذلكالشیءلیسبإنسانمثلا،ولیسأیضابلاإانسان.فیکونقداجتمعالشیءالذیهواللاإنسانوسالبه
الذیهولالاإنسان.
36 Behnam Zolghadr
Behnam Zolghadr - 9783110618839
Downloaded from De Gruyter Online at 05/19/2020 09:50:06PM
via free access
2 Arguments against the LNC
Rāzī gives four arguments on behalf of those who deny self-evident assents while
defending sensible propositions. The most self-evident assent is defined as “negation
and affirmation do not combine and cannot be removed” (al-nafy wa-l-iṯbāt lā yaǧ-
tamiʿān wa-lā yartafiʾān).¹⁵ Before discussing the arguments, a note on their method:
they are ad hominem. Each of them shows that holding the LNC is self-refuting; that
is, that accepting the LNC leads to its refutation. Thus, these arguments do not have
any presuppositions: they begin with the opponent’s stance and then show that it
refutes itself. Thus, in order to pose such arguments, one does not have to accept
the LNC.
Now let us briefly consider the relationship between these arguments and the
theory of states. As we will see, the first argument concerns intentionality. Asserting
the law of non-contradiction implies referring to contradiction.Whatever is intenda-
ble is real, and thus, the LNC is self-refuting. The second argument concerns exis-
tence, suggesting the ontological explanation of existence itself posed by the theory
of states. It can be considered as an argument for the claim that existence itself is
neither existent nor non-existent. As already mentioned, this claim is an important
part of the theory of states. The third argument concerns the problem of universals,
and is nothing more than an argument in favour of the theory of states concerning
this problem. Again, universals are one of the five categories of states. The fourth ar-
gument concerns impossibility and the process of becoming. In these two latter argu-
ments, the middle between existence and non-existence, which is the core of the
theory of states, is explicitly advocated. Thus, it is not only the middle between ex-
istence and non-existence which makes the connection between these arguments
and the theory of states, but also the targets of these arguments are some of the
most important aspects of this theory.
Rāzī explains the first argument as follows:
[T2] This assent is based on conceptualising non-existence, and people have been perplexed by
this. Because that which is conceptualised must be distinguished from other things, and what-
ever is distinguished from others must have an essential determination, and whatever is essen-
tially determined is an object in itself. Since the affirmation [of the law of non-contradiction] is
 In this passage, Rāzī sometimes defines the most self-evident assent as “affirmation and negation
do not combine and cannot be removed,” sometimes as “an object either is or is not,” and sometimes
as “negation and affirmation do not combine.” This may have been influenced by Avicenna’s argu-
ment that every violation of the LEM is also a violation of the LNC. As we will see, the arguments
against the LNC do not always directly target it; sometimes, they reject it via their rejection of the
LEM. This makes sense if we accept Avicenna’s argument. Thus, for simplicity, I will not explain
on every occasion that such a method is being used, but I will ask the reader to bear it in mind
while reading this section of the paper.
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based on this conceptualisation and this conceptualisation is impossible, therefore, this affirma-
tion is also impossible (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 30).¹⁶
Rāzī does not explicitly explain how the claim that “affirmation and negation do
not combine and cannot be removed” is based on conceptualising the non-existence.
Non-existence, in this affirmation, occurs in two places: first in negation and then
regarding truth-value gaps or gluts. Negating something of something is to claim
the non-existence of the former in the latter. For instance, asserting that “snow is
not black” is to affirm the non-existence of the accident of blackness in snow. More-
over, the claim that affirmation and negation are neither combined nor removed also
means that there are no truth-value gaps—that is, removal of both affirmation and
negation—or gluts—that is, combinations of affirmation and negation. Thus, it af-
firms the non-existence of truth-value gaps and gluts. I will consider both cases in
order to make the discussion sufficiently exclusive.
Since, following the LNC and the LEM, truth-value gaps and truth-value gluts are
non-existent, we must first be able to conceptualise non-existence. It is the same for
negation: for example, negating the blackness of snow, which is the non-existence of
blackness in snow. However, having a conceptualisation of non-existence is already
a problem, though not for the followers of Abū Hāšim. In fact, besides some of the
Muʿtazilites, no other Islamic theologians or Muslim peripatetic philosophers held
the view that some things do not exist. For this much larger group, every object is
existent. Thus, for them, non-existent is not an object and since an object is that
which is knowable, whatever does not exist is not an object and cannot be concep-
tualised.
As for truth-value gaps or truth-value gluts, talking about them implies their ob-
jecthood, because in order to be able to refer to them, or in Rāzī’s words, to have a
conceptualisation of them, they must be determined.Whatever is determined in itself
is an object, and if every object is existent, truth-value gaps and truth-value gluts be-
come existent and thus one cannot claim their non-existence. In other words, affirm-
ing the LNC and the LEM implies the conceptualisation of truth-value gaps and gluts.
Thus, anyone one who accepts the LNC or the LEM cannot hold them to be true.
One possible answer on behalf of the advocates of the view that every object is
existent is to make a distinction between mental existence and external existence.
Rāzī mentions this possible reply. In fact, Muslim peripatetic philosophers, such
as Avicenna, made this distinction. According to Rāzī, one cannot reply to the objec-
tion by embracing such a distinction between mental and external existence, be-
cause for those who advocate the LNC and the LEM, truth-value gaps and gluts are
impossible, not only in the external world, but also in the mind; in their view,
 أنهذاالتصدیقموقوفعلیتصورأصلعدموالناسقدتحیروافیه.لأنالمتصورلابدوأنیتمیزعنغیرهوالتمیزعنغیرهمتعین
فینفسه،وکلمتعینفیالنفسهفهوثابتفینفسه،فکلمتصورثابتفینفسه،فمالیسبثابتفغیرمتصورفالمعدومغیرثابتفلایکون
متصوراوإذاکانذلكالتصدیقمتفرعاعلیهذاالتصوروکانهذاالتصورممتنعاکانذلكالتصدیقممتنعا.
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they are unperceivable. Moreover, when a person negates the blackness of snow, it
does not follow that she affirms the existence of blackness in snow in her mind.
Thus, the mental–external distinction of existence is of no help here.
It should be noted that if this argument works, it works against those who hold
every object to be existent. One might well be an advocate of the LNC and the LEM
and yet hold the view that some objects do not exist.
Rāzī, then, explains the second argument:
[T3] Let us accept that non-existence can be conceptualised. However, the assertion that nega-
tion and affirmation do not combine implies a distinction between existence and non-existence,
and this distinction implies that the referent of non-existence has a distinct essence from that of
existence, but this is impossible, because every entity which the mind intends can also be re-
moved by the mind; otherwise, it does not have an opposite. Therefore, non-existence does
not have an opposite and this implies the denial of existence, and it is false. Thus, the removal
of that which is the referent of non-existence is coherent. However, this removal is a specific one
and is counted as a case of absolute non-existence, and it means that the complement of non-
existence is a part of it, which is impossible (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 30).¹⁷
Since negation and affirmation do not combine,¹⁸ there is a distinction between
existence and non-existence. In other words, there is nothing which is both existent
and non-existent, because affirmation implies the existence of an entity, such as an
accident or object, and negation implies the non-existence of an entity, such as an
accident or object, and these two—that is, affirmation and negation—do not com-
bine. Consequently, the referents of existence and non-existence are distinct. Rāzī
claims that this is not the case. Here is the reason why: on the assumption that ex-
istence can be removed by the mind, the removal of non-existence is the opposite of
non-existence; however, it is still a sub-case of non-existence, because all privations
are cases of non-existence. Hence, a contradiction: the removal of non-existence is
non-existence and not-non-existence at the same time. Therefore, the aforemen-
tioned distinction between existence and non-existence is impossible. To sum up,
the LNC is based on a distinction between existence and non-existence, which is im-
possible. Therefore, the LNC is not true.
Rāzī then proceeds to the third argument. This is the longest and the most com-
plicated of the four. Thus, I will first attempt to split the argument and then we will
discuss the details.
 لوسلمناإمکانتصورالعدملکانقولناالنفیوالإثباتلایجتمعانیستدعیامتیازالعدمعنالوجود،وامتیازالعدمعنالوجودیستدعیأن
یکونلمسمیالعدمهویةمتمیزةعنالوجودلکنذلكمحال،لأنکلهویةیشیرالعقلإلیهاوالعقلیمکنهرفعها،وإلالمیکنلهمقابل،وکان
یلزمأنلایکونللعدممقابلوکانیلزمنفیالوجودوهوباطل،فثبتأنارتفاعالهویةالمسماةبالعدممعقول،لکنارتفاعتلكالهویةارتفاع
خاصفیکونداخلاتحتالعدمالمطلق،فیکونقسیمالعدمقسمامنههذاخلف.
 Initially, Rāzī defines the conjunction of the LNC and the LEM as the most self-evident. However,
on some occasions, instead of the conjunction of the LNC and the LEM, he is only talking about the
LNC. One example is this passage of Muḥaṣṣal. Thus, the reader should be aware of the way Rāzī uses
the conjunction of the LNC and the LEM interchangeably with the LNC.
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Rāzī begins by making a distinction between two cases in which affirmation and
negation occur:¹⁹ first, affirming and negating the reality (ṯubūt) of the object itself,
such as “blackness is either existent or non-existent” (al-sawādu immā an yakūnu
mawǧūdān wa-immā an lā yakūnu mawǧūdān), and second, affirming or negating
the reality (ṯubūt) of an object in another object, such as “the body is either black
or not” (al-ǧismu wa-immā an yakūnu aswad wa-immā an lā yakūn).²⁰
Consider the first case:
(1) Blackness is either existent or non-existent.
As Rāzī says, (1) can be asserted only after conceiving the meaning of “blackness
is existent” and “blackness is non-existent,” but this is not going to happen.
(1.1) Blackness is existent.
In this statement, either blackness is identical with existent or blackness is dis-
tinct from existent. Rāzī demonstrates that both are false.
Let us take the first. As Rāzī puts it:
[T4] Our statement that blackness is existent [would] be like the statement “blackness is black-
ness” and the statement “existent is existent,” but it is not like these, for the [two] latter [state-
ments] are trivial; however, the former is informative (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 31).²¹
Thus, since “blackness is existent” is informative, it is not a simple identity state-
ment.
Then, Rāzī explains why the second understanding of (1.1)—that is, that black-
ness and existent are distinct—is also false. He gives two reasons for this:
[T5] One of them: that is, if existence is grounded in blackness, then blackness is not, as such,
existent, because otherwise the question arises again, but the same object cannot be existent for
a second time. And if so, existence would be grounded in that which is not existent. However,
existence is the property of existent. Otherwise, we should accept the middle between existence
and non-existence, but you deny that (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 31).²²
If existence is grounded in blackness, then blackness is metaphysically prior. In
other words, blackness is blackness without being existent and then existence is
grounded in it. It is obvious that blackness could not be existent before being exis-
tent because, as Rāzī explains, this would mean that it would be existent for a sec-
ond time. Moreover, the question about the latter existence would also arise for the
 Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 31.
 The reader should be aware that, as already mentioned, the theory of aḥwāl is based on the idea
that some objects do not exist. Thus, the predication relation does not have existential import in it-
self. My thanks to an anonymous referee for mentioning this point.
 . کانقولناالسوادموجودجاریامجریقولناالسوادسوادوقولناالموجودموجودومعلومأنهلیسکذلكلأنهذاالأخیرهذر،والأولمفید
 أحدهما:أنهإذاکانالوجودقائمابالسوادفالسوادفینفسهلیسبموجودوإلالعادبحثفیه،ولکانالشیءالواحدموجودامرتینوإذاکان
کذلكکانالوجودقائمابمالیسبموجود،لکانالوجودصفةموجودةوإلالثبتالواسطةبینالموجودوالمعدوموأنتمأنکرتموه.
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former. Thus, blackness in itself is non-existent. Since existence is the property of an
existent, it cannot be the property of blackness, because blackness is non-existent.
Therefore, Rāzī concludes, existence and blackness, in the statement “blackness is
existent,” cannot be distinct.²³ Here, Rāzī mentions the middle between existence
and non-existence as a solution to this issue. We saw in part 1 that this is the
main idea of the theory of states. In fact, this is the first explicit reference to the theo-
ry of states in these arguments.
Let us move on to the second argument for the impossibility of the distinction
between existence and blackness:
[T6] If existence is distinct from quiddity, the referent of our saying “blackness” is different from
our saying “existent.” Then, if we say that blackness is existent and by this we mean that black-
ness is that which is existent, this would be asserting the oneness of the two [non-identicals],
which is impossible (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 31).²⁴
We also cannot say that that which is existent is blackness, for this implies the iden-
tity of the two. This is unacceptable because we have already presupposed that black-
ness and existent are non-identical. Moreover, we have already seen that blackness
and existent cannot be identical.
One might reply that the identity sentence is asserting the identity relationship
between “blackness” and “described by being existent” and not that between “black-
ness” and “existent.” Rāzī explains to us that this reading faces similar problems and
does not work. As he put it:
[T7] And if you say that this is not what we intend from our saying that blackness is existent—
that is, that the referent of “blackness” is the referent of “existent”—but what we intend is that
blackness is described by being existent, you have just moved the issue to the referent of “de-
scribed.” Then, if the referent of blackness is the referent of “described by being existent,” then
this is also impossible, because our saying that blackness is described by being existent be-
comes the same as our saying that blackness is blackness, and that is impossible. And if [the
referent of blackness] is distinct from [the referent of “described by being existent”], then assert-
ing that blackness is described by existence is asserting the oneness of the two (Rāzī,
Muḥaṣṣal, 31).²⁵
Thus, replacing “existent” with “being described by existence” does not solve the
problem. Again, we will face the same problems as in the case of “existent.”
 However, if we consider that existence is grounded in blackness, this presupposition seems rea-
sonable if we analyse the structure of the sentence “blackness is existent” in a subject–predicate
form.
 إذاکانالوجودمغایراللماهیةکانمسمیقولناالسوادغیرمسمیقولناموجودفإذاقلناالسوادموجودبمعنیأنالسوادهوموجودکانذلك
حکمابوحدةالاثنینوهومحال.
 فإنقلتلیسالمرادمنقولناالسوادموجودوهوأنمسمیالسوادمسمیالوجود،بلالمرادأنالسوادموصوفبالموجودیةقلتفحینئذ
ینقلالکلامإلیمسمیالموصوفیة،فإنهإماأنیکونمسمیالموصوفیةبالوجودمحالفیکونقولناالسوادموصوفبالوجودجاریامجریقولنا
السوادسوادوهومحال،وإماأنیکونمغایرالهفیکونالحکمعلیالسوادبأنهموصوفبالوجودحکمبوحدةالاثنین.
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So far, Rāzī has shown that sentence (1.1) is false, or, to be more precise, impos-
sible (muḥāl). Obviously, it is impossible for one who endorses the LNC. Now, he pro-
ceeds to the second part of (1) and demonstrates that this is also false:
(1.2) Blackness is non-existent.
It is obvious that being blackness cannot be the same as the existence of black-
ness. Otherwise, as Rāzī explains, (1.2) entails that blackness is not blackness, which
is a contradiction.²⁶ Thus, existence is not identical with blackness. Then, Rāzī ar-
gues that blackness and its existence cannot also be distinct, if (1.2) is to be true.
The gist of his argument is as follows. Negating the existence of a quiddity im-
plies the quiddity to be determined and this in itself entails that the quiddity is real
(ṯābit). To be real is to be existent. Thus, in order to negate the existence of an entity,
it should be existent, which is a contradictory. Therefore, (1.2) cannot be asserted.
This is the well-known problem of negative existentials. It is obvious that this
argument is only against those who hold every object to be existent, or, in other
words, those who hold that all that is real (ṯābit) is existent. As already mentioned,
this was the dominant view among the falāsifah and mutakallimūn. However, some
Muʿtazilites held the view that some objects do not exist, or, in other words, that
there are real entities (ṯābitāt) which are non-existent. Among these Muʿtazilites
are those who advocated the theory of states; that is, Abū Hāšim and his followers.
However, since one can well be an advocate of the theory that some objects do not
exist and also be an advocate of the LNC, like some of the early Muʿtazilites, this ar-
gument loses its generality.
Then, Rāzī proceeds to the second form of the sentence expressing the LNC:
(2) A body is either black or not.
First, we should grasp the meanings of both “the body is black” and “the body is
not black.” Rāzī argues that this is impossible. He begins with “the body is black,”
giving us two reasons for the “impossibility of this statement.” First, it cannot be
an identity statement; otherwise, it is asserting the oneness of two distinct entities,
which is impossible. Second, since it is not an identity statement, it has the form of a
subject–predicate sentence in which the subject is described by the predicate. Now,
as Rāzī explains, “that the body is described by blackness is either a non-existential
property or an existential one.”²⁷
Being described (mawṣūf) is itself a property. It is not a non-existential property,
because it is the negation of not being described, which is itself a non-existential
property. On the other hand, Rāzī also argues that being described is not an existen-
tial property:
 These arguments are against those who defend the LNC. Thus, any premise which entails a con-
tradiction is not acceptable. See Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 32.
 Rāzī, 33.
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[T8] If [being described] is existential, then it is either the same as the existence of the body and
blackness or distinct from them. The former is impossible, because it is not the case that when-
ever one conceives the existence of the body and the existence of blackness, one also conceives
that the body is described by blackness. The latter is also impossible, because if being described
by blackness were superadded to the body, then being described by that property [i.e., the prop-
erty of being described] would also be superadded to the body. But this [leads to regress and
thus] is impossible (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 33).²⁸
Here, Rāzī is asking about the ontological status of a property. Is there a reality
which is correspondent to the property of an object? He replies that the answer is nei-
ther yes nor no. The property of being described is not existential. In other words,
there is no reality (ṯābit) which is the property of being described. In order to be
real, being described by blackness for a body should either be the same as the
body and blackness itself or distinct from these two. It is not the same as the
body and blackness, for one can conceive these two without conceiving the body
being described by blackness. In other words, the existence of a body and the exis-
tence of blackness do not entail that the body is black, or that the body is described
by blackness. Thus, there should be another reality which is described (mawṣūf) and
is distinct from the body and blackness. But this is also impossible, because then
there would have to be another reality which is being described by being described,
and this leads to regress. Therefore, neither of these possibilities is true.
This argument exposes one of the problems which the theory of states answers:
the problem of universals. As already mentioned in section 1, Abū Hāšim’s theory of
states, among other things, explains the ontological status of properties. According
to other mutakallimūn, the ontological categories of the world consisted of God,
atoms, and accidents. However, these cannot explain what it is to have a property.
Relying on the grammarians’ analysis of language, Abū Hāšim appealed to states
(aḥwāl) to explain the ontological status of properties. This argument demonstrates
the shortcoming of the theories which Abū Hāšim criticised in order to give a full-
fledged ontological explanation of the world.
Let us move on to the fourth argument against the LNC, which is also an explicit
defense of the theory of states. This argument concerns impossibility (imtināʿ) and
the process of becoming (ḥudūṯ). First, consider impossibility. Rāzī says that there
are three possibilities for that which is called impossibility:²⁹ either it is existent,
or it is non-existent, or it is neither existent nor non-existent. He demonstrates
that the first two possibilities are false:
 أنیکونأمراثبوتیالأنهعلیهذاالتقدیرإماأنیکوننفسوجودالجسموالسوادوإماأنیکونمغایرالهما.والأولمحاللأنهلیسکل
منعقلوجودالجسمووجودالسوادعقلکونالجسمموصوفابالسواد.والثانیأیضامحاللأنموصوفیةالجسمبالسوادلوکانتصفةزائدة
لکانتموصوفیةالجسمبتلکالصفةزائدةعلیهاوهومحال.
 He does not tell us why it cannot be both existent and non-existent. Even if he thinks that the
truth-value gap here is the same as the truth-value glut, he does not explain it. However, there is
a fourth possibility; i.e., both existent and non-existent.
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[T9] It is not existent, because otherwise that which is described by it would also be existent.
For existent cannot be placed at non-existent and if that which is described [by impossible] were
existent, then the impossible would not be existent; however, it would either be necessary or
possible (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 34).³⁰
The instances of impossibility are non-existent because otherwise, they would not be
impossible. Since those which are described by impossibility are not existent, impos-
sibility is not existent because existent cannot be grounded (qāʾim) in non-existent.
Impossibility cannot be non-existent either,
[T10] because it is the negation of not-impossibility which can be predicated to non-existent.
Thus, since not-impossibility is non-existential, impossibility is not non-existential. Moreover,
impossibility is a determined quiddity in itself, which is distinct from other quiddities. Other-
wise, it could not be intended by the mind. Thus, it cannot be absolute non-entity (Rāzī,
Muḥaṣṣal, 34).³¹
There are two arguments in this paragraph in favour of the view that impossibility
is not non-existent. It is dubious that the result follows in the first one. For one
thing, impossibility is the negation of possibility and a similar argument can be ap-
plied to demonstrate that impossibility is non-existential. According to the second
argument, what is impossible is supposed not to be an entity simply because it is im-
possible. However, since it can be intended by the mind, it must be something, and
thus, by understanding non-existence in its broadest sense, it is not absolutely non-
existent. Rāzī also considers a possible reply according to which the impossible has
reality in the mind and not in the external world. Rāzī rejects this reply by empha-
sising the nature of the impossible which is impossible in itself, whether in the
mind or in the external world.³²
Now consider the process of becoming existent from non-existence. As Rāzī
explains, becoming means coming out of non-existence into existence. Thus, the ref-
erent of becoming is distinct from both the referent of non-existence and the referent
of existence, because otherwise, “the referent of non-existence or the referent of exis-
tence will be the referent of coming out of non-existence into existence, and that is im-
possible.” He considers three possibilities for that which is the quiddity of the refer-
ent of coming out of non-existence into existence. It is either existent, non-existent,
or neither existent nor non-existent. Then, he demonstrates that it cannot be exis-
tent:
 لاجائزأنیکونموجوداوإلالکانالموصوفبهموجودالاستحالةقیامالموجودبالمعدومولوکانالموصوفبهموجودالمیکنالممتنع
ممتنعا،بلإماواجباأوممکنا.
 لأنهنقیضاللاامتناعالذییمکنحملهعلیالمعدومفیکوناللاامتناععدمیافلایکونالامتناععدمیا.ولأنالامتناعماهیةمتعینةفی
نفسهامتمیزةعنسائرالماهیاتإذلولمیکنکذلكلاستحالإشارةالعقلإلیها،وإذاکانکذلكاستحالأنیکوننفیامحضا.
 Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 34.
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[T11] If it was existent, it would be true of the existent that it is coming out of non-existence into
existence, and if this is so, it would be like saying that the existent is coming out towards exis-
tence and thus the object is existent twice, and that is impossible (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 34).³³
It is also not non-existent, because otherwise, there would be no change from non-
existence to existence. As Rāzī put it:
[T12] When it is non-existent, the original non-existence endures, and as long as the original
non-existence endures, no change from non-existence occurs (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 34).³⁴
Since it cannot be either existent or non-existent, Rāzī concludes that when some-
thing is in the process of becoming, it is neither existent nor non-existent. As already
mentioned, the same is true of the impossible. Therefore, the LNC is not true.
So far, we have discussed the four arguments against the LNC which, according
to Rāzī, were posed by those thinkers who accept sensible assents, but altogether
deny self-evident assents.We also saw that these arguments are based on the theory
of states, or, to be more precise, the middle between existence and non-existence,
which is the core idea of the theory of states, as well as the idea that some objects
do not exist.
As already mentioned, they also argue that other well-known self-evident as-
sents are based on the LNC, and since the LNC has been rejected, those assents
are also unacceptable. These self-evident assents are the subject of the next section.
3 Other Self-Evident Assents
There are three other well-known self-evident assents: (i) The whole is bigger than
its parts; (ii) identity is transitive; (iii) an object cannot be in two different places
at the same time. The philosophers in question argue that all three of these assents
are based on the LNC. We will see their arguments one by one.
 فإنکانتموجودةفقدصدقعلیالموجودأنهیخرجمنالعدمإلیالوجودفیکونذلكکأنهیقالالموجودیخرجإلیالوجودفیکونالشیء
موجودامرتینوهومحال.
 . متیکانتمعدومةکانالعدمالأصلیباقیاومتیکانالعدمالأصلیباقیالمیکنالنقلفیالتغیرمنالعدمحاصلا
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3.1 The whole is bigger than its parts
As Rāzī put it:
[T13] The whole is bigger than its parts because otherwise, the existence of the other part and its
non-existence would be the same. Thus, being existent and being non-existent is combined, at
the same time, in the other part (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 29).³⁵
It is obvious that here, parthood is proper parthood. Thus, consider an object, name-
ly a, which has two proper parts, namely b and c. By using mereological formalisa-
tion, we have:
b & a , c & a
Since b and c are two distinct parts of a, they do not overlap. Thus:
'c " a& , -'c " b&
It follows that:
1' & .x' x " a' & , - x " b' &&
On the other hand, if a was not bigger than b, we would have a $ b, which means
that parthood is improper. Then, it follows:
2' &-.x' x " a' & , - x " b' &&
Therefore, (1) and (2) are contradictories. They express that there both is and is not an
object—namely, c—which is the other part of a, while b is a proper part of a and is
not smaller than a.
The rejection of this assent leads to contradiction. Thus, this is true as long as the
LNC is true. In other words, the statement that the whole is bigger than its parts is
based on the LNC.
3.2 Identity is transitive
Identity is transitive. In other words, two objects which are identical with a third ob-
ject are themselves identical with each other:
[T14] [Two] objects that are identical with another object are identical, because otherwise, [an
object, namely] a which is identical with blackness is blackness. And since it is identical with
that which is not blackness, it is not blackness. Hence, if a is identical with two different things,
 الکلأعظممنالجزءلأنهلولمیکنذلكلکانوجودالجزءالآخروعدمهبمثابةواحدة،فحینئذیجتمعفیذلكالجزءالآخرکونهموجودا
معدومامعا.
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it follows that a is in itself blackness and also that a is not in itself blackness. Thus, the affir-
mation and the negation are combined (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 29).³⁶
Let us simplify the example. Suppose there are three objects—a, b! and c,—and sup-
pose, for the sake of simplicity, that there are only two properties, P1 and P2. a has
both properties and b only has the property P2. c is identical with a, and thus it has
both properties. Therefore, P1c and P2c are both true. On the other hand, c is identical
with b. Thus, c has the property P2! but it does not have the property P1. This means
that -P1c and P2c are true. Therefore, P1c , -P1c, which is a contradiction. The table
below shows the details:
P1 P2
a % %
b * %
c # %
If two distinct objects, a and b, are identical with a third object, c, then the third ob-
ject will have contradictory properties.³⁷ Thus, the rejection of the transitivity of iden-
tity entails contradictions. If the LNC is not true, then at least some contradictions
are true, and therefore, it is not necessarily true that identity is transitive.
3.3 An object cannot be in two different places at the same time
[T15] A single object cannot be in two different places at the same time, because if this was pos-
sible, then there would be no difference between an object being in two places or two objects
being so, and meanwhile, the existence of the other object would be the same as its non-exis-
tence, and it would be true to say that it is both existent and non-existent (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 29).³⁸
Suppose that a is an object which is located at l1 and suppose that at the same time a
is also located in another place, namely, l2. This scenario is similar to a scenario in
 الأشیاءالمساویةلشیءواحدمتساویةلأنهلولمیکنکذلكلکانالألفالمحکومعلیهبأنهیساویالسوادسوادالامحالة،ومنحیثإنه
محکومعلیهبأنهیساویمالیسبسوادیجبأنلایکونسوادافلوکانالألفمساویاللأمرینلزمأنیکونالألففینفسهسواداوأنلایکون
فینفسهسوادافیجتمعالنفیوالإثبات.
 Here, the Leibnizian definition of identity is used. According to this definition, two objects are
identical if they share the same properties. For more on the non-transitivity of identity and its result-
ing contradictions, see Graham Priest, One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of Its
Parts, Including the Singular Object which Is Nothingness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014),
chapter 2.
 إنالجسمالواحدفیالآنالواحدلایکونفیمکانینمعا،لأنهلوجازذلكلماتمیزالجسمالواحدالحاصلفیمکانینمتباینینعن
الجسمیناللذینحصلاکذلك،وحینئذلایتمیزوجودالجسمالآخرعنعدمهفیصدقعلیهکونهموجودامعدومامعا.
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which there are two objects, a and b, which both have exactly the same properties
with only one exception: that is a is located in l1 and b is located in l2. According
to this argument, since these two scenarios are not distinguishable, b can be con-
sidered as both existent and non-existent. Thus, the rejection of this assent entails
a contradiction. Since the LNC is already rejected, at least some contradictions
might be true. Therefore, if the LNC is not true, this assent is not true either.
There is also another more straightforward argument that this assent is based on
the LNC. Let us write the property of being located in l1 as P. Thus, if a is located in l1
and is not located in l1, we have Pa , -Pa, which is a contradiction.
4 Dialetheism and Paraconsistency
In this part, we will see how the violation of the LNC co-exists with the theory of
states without demolishing the coherency of the theory of states and the ability to
reason within this theory.³⁹ Let us accept that the aforementioned arguments against
the LNC work. Since this rejection of the LNC logically follows from the theory of
states, the theory of states is a dialetheic theory. However, we already saw that
some contradictions are true in the theory of states; for example, that states are
and are not objects. Now, we should discuss how the theory can be logically model-
led.
The logic of a dialetheic theory should be a paraconsistent one. A paraconsistent
logic is a logic whose consequence relation is not explosive;⁴⁰ that is, explosion, or
ex contradiction quodlibet (ECQ), is not a valid argument in that logic. Otherwise, the
theory will be trivial; that is, everything, and consequently every contradiction,
would be true according to this theory.⁴¹ There are many paraconsistent logics on
the market. Before choosing one, we should take another look at the theory of states
and focus on the claims which are critical to the LNC and the LEM. These are two:
(1) “states are neither existent nor non-existent” and (2) “states are and are not ob-
 Marwan Rashed gives another interpretation of the theory of states by focusing only on truth-
value gaps and applying intuitionistic logic. For more, see Marwan Rashed, “Abū Hāshim al-
Ǧubbāʾī sur le langage de l’art,” Histoire E´piste´mologie Langage 36, no. 2 (2014): 85–96, and Rashed,
“Abū Hāshim al-Ǧubbāʾī et l’infini,” in Miroir de l’amitie´: Me´langes offerts a` Joël Biard, ed. Cristophe
Grellard (Paris: Vrin, 2017).
 In classical logic, explosion—i.e., the argument A , -A⊢B—is valid. According to explosion, or ex
contradiction quodlibet, from an arbitrary contradiction, everything follows. However, in his defence
of the principle of non-contradiction, Aristotle does not propose this argument, although Avicenna
later defended a primary form of explosion in Metaphysics of the Healing, 42. Finally, in the twelfth
century,Willian of Soissons formalised the argument for explosion in a way which is valid in classical
logic. For more, see Benham Zolghadr, “Avicenna on the Law of Non-Contradiction,” History and Phi-
losophy of Logic 40, no. 2 (2019): 105–15.
 It is obvious that the theory of states is not trivial: “nothing exists in the world” is not true in this
theory.
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jects.” The former seems to state a truth-value gap, while the latter is apparently a
truth-value glut. If we accept both truth-value gaps and gluts in the theory of states,
we need a four-valued logic. A good candidate might be the logic of FDE.⁴² However,
there are other ways to choose the proper logic for the theory of states while keeping
the theory as simple as possible. Perhaps the best choice is the three-valued logic
LP.⁴³ In LP, propositions can be only true, only false, and both true and false. By ap-
plying LP, not only do we have a simpler logic with more straightforward interpreta-
tions, but we can also have the truth of (1) without the need for a fourth value; that
is, neither true nor false.We will see the details after an explanation of LP. Since, for
the purpose of this paper, the propositional logic of LP suffices, I will restrict the dis-
cussion to it and skip the first-order LP.
A logic is defined by the structure & V ! D! f c # c 0 C! 1 # $ V is the set of truth val-
ues, D, which is a subset of V, is the set of designated values, C is the set of connec-
tives, and f c is the corresponding truth function. For LP, we have:
$ $ 0! 0$5! 1! 1
& $ !0$5! 11
( $ -! ,! +! 1
Thus, the truth values are true, both true and false, and false, which are convention-
ally represented by 0, 0.5, and 1 respectively. The designated values are true and both
true and false. The connectives are negation, conjunction, and disjunction. The ma-
terial conditional can be defined as follows:
A ( B / -A + B
An interpretation for the language is a map, ", from the set of propositional param-
eters, P, into V . This is extendable to all the formulas of the language by applying
truth functions recursively. This extension is done through the following conditions:
" -A' & $ 1 * " A' &
" A , B' & $ %!) " A' &! " B' &! 1
" A + B' & $ %'" " A' &! " B' &! 1
The notions of logical truth and semantic consequence are defined as follows:
Σ ) A iff there is no interpretation, ", such that for all B 0 Σ! " B' & 0 D, but
" A' &%0D$
A is a logical truth iff for every interpretation " A' & 0 D.
 For more about FDE, see Graham Priest, Non-Classical Logic, An Introduction to Non-Classical
Logic: From If to Is, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chapter 8.
 For more about LP, see Priest, chapter 7.
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It can easily be checked that LP is not explosive; that is, ECQ is not a valid argu-
ment in LP.
P , -P ) Q
For a counter-model, suppose:
" P' & $ 0$5
" Q' & $ 0
Thus, contradictions can be true in LP without making the system trivial.
Two comments are in order here. LP has the simplest semantics among all the
paraconsistent logics. In fact, LP is a minimal revision to classical logic and classical
logic is a proper extension of LP. These make LP a good choice for the desired para-
consistent logic.
Now let us return to the theory of states. As already seen, states both are and are
not objects. Hence, for every state, we have the following sentence: P , -P. LP han-
dles such contradictions without falling into triviality. Moreover, one important as-
pect of the theory of states is the middle between existence and non-existence. We
saw that this is usually seemingly uttered as a truth-value gap. There are three values
in LP, none of which is neither true nor false. Therefore, we should explain how to
understand “a state is neither existent nor non-existent” without appealing to the
truth value of “neither true nor false.” This can easily be done via the following in-
ference from double negation:
-P , --P ) -P , P
One can easily check that this argument is valid in LP. In section 1, we saw the same
argument from Avicenna, demonstrating that any gappy sentence results in a contra-
diction. Thus, to say that states are neither existent nor non-existent is another form
of saying that states are both existent and non-existent. Therefore, we can preserve
the truths of the theory of states in LP, especially about the claims critical to the LNC
and the LEM. This is also true of the impossible and becoming, which we met in the
discussion of arguments against the LNC.
As already mentioned, at the beginning of this section, we chose LP over FDE.
Now we know the reasons for this choice. In addition to the merits of LP due to
its simplicity and its relation to classical logic, seeming truth-value gaps in the theo-
ry of states can be paraphrased as truth-value gluts by applying LP.
Before finishing this section, I should say more about the use of contemporary
logical apparatus which we saw in this paper. It is obvious that the theory of states
and the context in which it was stated are very far away from modern logic. Thus,
I do not claim that Abū Hāšim and his followers would accept this methodology
or that they would confirm the brief formalisation of the theory of states which
we have seen here. The aim of applying LP to some aspects of the theory of states
is nothing more to show that it is possible to have a model of the theory—or to be
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more precise, a dialetheic reading of the theory—without losing its coherency. It is
also obvious that a model of a theory is merely an abstraction which only grasps
some aspects of the theory in question. Here, we have only provided a sketch of
the idea, which I think suffices for the purposes of this paper.
5 Conclusion
After discussing the arguments against the LNC, Rāzī says:
These objections are only a drop of the sea of objections which have been raised against our
saying that an object either is or is not. And if this is the state of the strongest self-evident [as-
sent], what do you think about the weaker ones?⁴⁴
Rāzī seems to be exaggerating about the number of objections to the LNC, but his
discussion of the LNC shows that there were ongoing debates about it which were
driven by the proponents of the theory of states. Unfortunately, none of Abū Hāšim’s
works has survived and most of the works of his followers are no longer extant.
Hence, it is not possible to trace back the arguments discussed above to their advo-
cates. As already mentioned, Rāzī himself is not an opponent of the LNC. He is well
known to have enjoyed rejecting different views only for the sake of argument. How-
ever, it seems unlikely that the arguments that we discussed in this paper are his. For
one thing, he explicitly talks about others who hold this view, at various points in the
text, though with all that said, we do not know who posed those arguments first. Let
us leave it to historians and scholars to decide. Moreover, we saw that the theory of
states, understood as a theory which violates the LNC, can, by applying modern log-
ical apparatus, be coherently uttered within the contemporary metaphysical scene.
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Rashed, Marwan. “Abū Hāshim al-Ǧubbāʾī sur le langage de l’art.” Histoire E´piste´mologie Langage
36, no. 2 (2014): 85–96.
Rāzī, Faḫr al-Dīn al-. Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʾaḫḫirīn. Cairo: Dār al-Turaṯ, 1995.
Šahrastānī, Muḥammad. Nihāyah. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1956.
Schmidtke, Sabine. “The Muʿtazilite Movement III: The Scholastic Phase.” In The Oxford Handbook
of Islamic Theology, edited by Sabine Schmidtke, 159–80. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016.
Thiele, Jan. “Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāʾī’s (d. 321/933) Theory of ‘States’ (aḥwāl) and Its Adaption by
Ashʿarite Theologians.” In The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, edited by Sabine
Schmidtke, 364–83. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Van Ess, Josef. “The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology.” In Logic in Classical Islamic Culture,
edited by Gustave E. von Grunebaum, 21–50. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970.
Zolghadr, Behnam. “Avicenna on the Law of Non-Contradiction.” History and Philosophy of Logic
40, no. 2 (2019): 105–15.
52 Behnam Zolghadr
Behnam Zolghadr - 9783110618839
Downloaded from De Gruyter Online at 05/19/2020 09:50:06PM
via free access
